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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
VS. 1 
MICHAEL C. THOMPSON and 1 
BRUCE A. CONKLIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
t Case No. 880181 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, having granted the Defendants' Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, on the sole issue of the propriety of 
admission of evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers 
Act. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Court of Appeals decision of which the Defendants 
obtained review by this Court is State v. Thompson, et al., 751 
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988), where the defendants' convictions in 
Third District Court for bribery, anti-trust, and racketeering 
were upheld. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the defendants have standing to invoke the 
exclusionary rule with respect to evidence used to convict them 
at trial? 
2. Was the Trial Court correct in admitting evidence 
obtained by use of the Subpoena Powers Act? 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling constitutional and statutory provisions 
are reproduced in full in the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case. Defendant Michael C. 
Thompson, was convicted after a jury trial in the Third District 
Court of five counts of bribery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-508(b), each a Class B misdemeanor, one count of antitrust 
violation under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and 
two counts of racketeering in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1603, with each of the racketeering counts being a felony of 
the second degree. Defendant Bruce A. Conklin, was convicted 
following the same jury trial of five counts of bribery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B 
misdemeanor, one count of antitrust violation under Utah Code 
Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and one count of racketeering in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, the racketeering count 
being a felony of the second degree. 
The convictions on all counts of both defendants were 
upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Thompson, et al., 
751 P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988). 
This Court granted the Petition for Certiorari by the 
defendants on the sole issue of the propriety of admission of 
evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act. 
_o_ 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Judge Judith M. Billings, presiding, on July 19, 
through August 1, 1985. Following trial, the jury found each 
defendant guilty of five counts of bribery and of all antitrust 
and racketeering counts (R. 378). 
On September 13, 1985, the trial court sentenced 
defendant Thompson to serve not less than one year nor more than 
15 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 455-457). Defendant 
Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake County 
Jail on work release (R. 448-450). Defendants were each fined 
$25,000.00 for the antitrust violations (R. 449, 456). 
The defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on September 
13, 1985. Their sentences were stayed on appeal, and their 
initial brief as well as the State's response was filed in this 
Court. Subsequently, the case was transferred by this Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. The case was then certified to this 
Court by the Court of Appeals, but was returned to the Court of 
Appeals where the case was briefed and argued. (751 P.2d 805, 
807) The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants convictions in 
an opinion published March 9, 1988, and denied petitioner's 
Petition for Rehearing on April 8, 1988. 
As previously indicated, this Court granted a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals on the issue 
of whether evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act 
was properly admitted by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah law provides two methods for formally 
investigating criminal activities. The first is the grand jury 
process; the second is that authorized by the Subpoena Powers 
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1 to 3 (1982). (See Addendum A) It 
is the Subpoena Powers Act and evidence gathered pursuant to the 
Act which is the focus of the issues before the Court in this 
case. 
This Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the 
Act and discussed at length its provisions, philosophical 
underpinnings, and purposes, in In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988).1 
As this Court observed the Act was passed in 1971 and 
recodified in 1980. The legislature specifically set forth the 
purposes of the Act. 
"It is declared, as a matter of 
legislative determination, that it is 
necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid of 
criminal investigations and to provide a 
method of keeping information gained from 
investigations secret both to protect the 
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to 
prosecution and to clarify the power of the 
attorney general and county attorneys to 
grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses 
whose testimony is essential to the proper 
conduct of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution." § 77-22-1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1982). 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Utah 
Attorney General obtained the approval of the Seventh District 
The Utah Legislature amended the Subpoena Powers Act in the 
1989 General Session to confront with the Court's opinion. The 
amended portions of the statute are included in Addendum B. 
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Court, to conduct an investigation. 
This authorization of the District Court was obtained 
on January 26, 1983. As this Court has observed regarding the 
investigation, 
MThe scope of the investigation was set 
forth in a good cause affidavit, signed by a 
special agent of the attorney general, that 
accompanied the application. The affidavit 
stated that on the basis of a confidential 
report prepared by the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation's Division of Public 
Utilities, interviews with unnamed sources, 
and an investigation of UP & L, the affiant 
had concluded that certain of UP & L's assets 
had been stolen. The affidavit described the 
stolen assets as UP & L's labor and 
materials. The affidavit further alleged 
that the theft of these assets had been 
accomplished by kickbacks, payoffs, bid-
fixing, falsification of shipment and 
delivery information, personal use or sale of 
UP & L property, and threats. 
Id. at 638. 
Pursuant to the Act the District Court authorized the 
Attorney General to conduct the criminal investigation and 
further authorized the issuance of subpoenas compelling the 
attendance and sworn testimony of witnesses and the production of 
books, papers, documents, etc. which constitute evidence "which 
is or may be relevant to the investigation in the judgement of 
the Attorney General . . . • " S 77-22-2 Utah Code Ann. (1982). 
See also .Id. at 754 P.2d 638. 
Following this authorization the Attorney General did 
subpoena witnesses and gather documents. The defendants 
themselves were never subpoenaed, nor did they ever testify in 
connection with the investigation. 
As this Court has observed, subpoenas were directed to 
banks, state agencies, and other document repositories. J^ i. at 
638. 
The subpoenas directed to the bank accounts of the 
defendants and/or over which they had signature authority were 
complied with and information relative to the banking 
transactions of the defendants as well as L. Brent Fletcher, 
Security Director for Utah Power and Light Company were obtained. 
The defendants were not notified of the existence of these 
subpoenas by the Attorney General nor presumably were the 
defendants notified by the banking institutions of these 
subpoenas. 
These subpoenas and others as well as interviews and 
other investigative efforts produced evidence upon which charges 
were brought against the defendants, Michael Ziemski, and L. 
2 
Brent Fletcher. 
The charges were filed against the defendants in April 
of 1984 in 5th (now 3rd) Circuit Court in Salt Lake County. The 
following month motions to quash certain subpoenas were filed in 
7th District Court by certain recipients of subpoenas and it was 
argued at that time, (May 1984) that among other things the Act 
was unconstitutional. The Seventh District Court ruled that the 
Subpoena Powers Act would be presumed constitutional provided 
certain procedures were followed by the Attorney General's 
2 
The conviction of Ziemski was affirmed along with that of the 
defendants in State v. Thompson, et al. 751 P.2d 805 (Utah App. 
1988), but he is not a party to this action. Fletcher's 
conviction was affirmed in State v. Fletcher, 751 P.2d 822 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
office. Id. at 639. 
The Seventh District Court subsequently ruled on 
September 20, 1984, that the Act was unconstitutional on its face 
and as applied. Ici. at 639. (See Addendum C). It is important 
to note that the Seventh District Court gave no opinion and 
rendered no judgement whatever about whether the rights of the 
defendants had been violated and certainly did not attempt to 
rule on the admissibility of evidence, nor upon the validity of 
any of the subpoenas which produced evidence against the 
defendants. 
Subsequently, the defendants brought a motion to 
suppress certain evidence in December 1984 in Third District 
Court. During the hearing on the Motion to Suppress (R.1037. 
Transcript Dated Dec. 27, 1984) the defendants did not identify 
what they claimed were defective subpoenas even though they had 
been supplied with those subpoenas which had produced evidence in 
the case (R.1037, p.5), nor did they specify what evidence was 
gathered in violation of their rights. The Motion was denied and 
the defendants proceeded to trial resulting in their convictions 
and in the affirmance of those convictions on appeal. 
The defendants' petition for writ of certiorari was 
granted on the single issue of whether evidence gathered pursuant 
to the Subpoena Powers Act should have been suppressed. 
Defendants have incorrectly and no doubt inadvertently 
stated that "the trial court admitted evidence based on an 
unconstitutional statute- (Defendants' Brief, pp. 33*34). This 
statement is wrong and without foundation inasmuch as this Court 
specifically held the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional. 
In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendants characterize the investigation which led 
to their convictions as having been conducted in violation of 
their Utah and Federal constitutional rights. However, 
defendants have never demonstrated why they have standing to make 
this argument. Specifically defendants have failed to explain 
why subpoenas sent to third parties impinge upon their 
constitutional rights. This Court has ruled in situations 
comparable to the case before the bar that constitutional rights 
are personal in nature and cannot be claimed through third 
parties. Similarly, the State urges this Court in this matter to 
rule that bank and other records in the possesssion of depository 
institutions may be obtained through legal process and are not 
suppressable for the reason that the obtaining of these records 
(through proper legal process) does not create any standing in 
the defendants. 
A closely related though separate issue is whether or 
not the evidence obtained by the Subpoena Powers Act should have 
been suppressed. Both the Trial Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have ruled that the documents should not be suppressed 
and were properly admissible. 
The defendants have repeatedly made the general 
nonspecific argument that their constitutional rights were 
violated. The defendants have never explained how, in what 
particulars, these rights were violated nor do they identify 
which piece or pieces of evidence were admitted in violation of 
those rights nor do they explain how evidence in the possession 
of third parties was subpoenaed in violation of their rights. 
The Court is urged to affirm the holding of the Trial 
Court and Court of Appeals that evidence gathered pursuant to the 
Subpoena Powers Act was properly admitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO INVOKE 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITH RESPECT TO 
EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THEM AT TRIAL 
The defendants' rights were not violated during the 
criminal investigation that resulted in their convictions. They 
make sweeping allegations that their rights, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection, under both the 
Federal and Utah State Constitutions, suffered wholesale 
violation during the criminal investigation that ultimately 
resulted in their convictions. They further claim that these 
alleged violations require a wholesale suppression of the 
evidence used to convict them. However, defendants fail to 
support these allegations with any facts or applicable law. 
Respondent State of Utah submits that in fact none of 
defendants' individual constitutional rights were violated during 
the investigation, and evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena 
Powers Act was properly admitted. 
A. Search and Seizure. 
Defendants argue that their Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when the Attorney General subpoenaed records from 
"appellants' bankers, accountants and business associates," but 
defendants completely fail to identify or be specific about what 
those records are and from whom they were obtained. The record 
in this case at (R. 391-404) sets forth what exhibits were 
admitted, yet the defendants fail to identify what documents were 
received in violation of their rights. This lack of specificity 
permeates the whole of the defendants' arguments to this Court 
(Defendants' Brief p.9). In fact the defendants' bank and 
business records were subpoenaed and used as evidence against 
them at their trial, but defendants themselves were never 
subpoenaed nor did they give any testimony. It is not enough for 
defendants to claim prejudice merely through the use of evidence 
gathered from a third party, even assuming a violation of the 
rights of the subpoenaed person. This has been stated clearly by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he established principle is that 
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendmient violation can be 
successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by 
the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the 
introduction of damaging evidence." Alderman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 165, 171 (1968). The evidence about which the 
defendants complain was the product of subpoenas sent to third 
parties. 
Defendants reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886) which held invalid a statute requiring a criminal 
defendant to divulge personal "books, papers, and records," is 
misplaced. Appellants seek to extend the holding of Boyd to the 
"books, papers, and records" in the possession of and held by 
"appellants' bankers, accountants and business associates." This 
ignores an entire line of cases from both this Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court which require that a defendant be directly 
aggrieved in order to have standing to challenge the legality of 
the search and seek to suppress the evidence. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated, 
MIn order to qualify as a 'person 
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' 
one must be the victim of a search or 
seizure, one against whom the search was 
directed, as distinguished from one who 
claims prejudice only through the use of 
evidence gathered as a consequence of a 
search or seizure directed at someone else. . 
. . 
"Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper 
to require of one who seeks to challenge the 
legality of a search as the basis for 
suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, 
and if the allegations be disputed that he 
establish, that he himself was the victim of 
the invasion of privacy. 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1968), citing, 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, at 261 (1960). Without 
defendants showing the necessary factual nexus between the 
violation of their individual rights and the gathering of the 
complained of evidence, suppression is simply not an appropriate 
remedy. The Supreme Court was later petitioned to expand the 
concept of standing defined in Jones to a so-called "target-
theory," which is essentially appellants' position in this case. 
Under the target theory, a defendant would be able "to assert 
that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party 
entitled him to have evidence suppressed at his trial." Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). However, the Supreme Court 
held, 
We decline to extend the rule of 
standing in Fourth Amendment cases in the 
manner suggested by petitioners. As we 
stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165, 174 (1969), "Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights which, like some other 
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously 
asserted." A person who is aggrieved by an 
illegal search and seizure only through the 
introduction of damaging evidence secured by 
a search of a third person's premises or 
property has not had any of his Fourth 
Amendment rights infringed. And since the 
exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate 
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is 
proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated to 
benefit from the rule's protections. 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 133-34 (citations omitted). This 
Court has similarly limited a defendant's right to seek 
suppression of evidence to situations where there has been a 
personal Fourth Amendment violation. 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons and houses against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as assured by Sec. 14, 
Art. I, Utah Constitution, and Amendment IV 
of the federal Constitution is personal in 
nature and can be asserted only by one whose 
right is violated. [Defendant] had no such 
rights in the house, car, or in the evidence 
seized, and therefore cannot complain of the 
court's refusal to suppress that evidence." 
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 480. See also, State v. 
Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (1966),and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1984). As in Griffin, Montayne and Valdez, defendants have 
wholly failed to articulate a single fact or circumstance that 
puts them in the position of having their individual Fourth 
Amendment rights violated, and, therefore, cannot claim the 
protection of the exclusionary rule to suppress the complained of 
evidence. 
Although the exclusionary rule is applied differently 
to evidence obtained by warrant and evidence obtained by 
subpoena, a violation of a Fourth Amendment right has still been 
held to be a necessary prerequisite for the suppression of 
evidence gathered by subpoena. United States v. Millerf 425 U.S. 
435 (1976). 
Defendants also ignore a plethora of policy reasons set 
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court identifying the exclusionary rule 
as a judicially mandated safeguard of Fourth Amendment rights. 
It is not a constitutional right. 
The primary justification for the 
exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of 
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment 
rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established 
that the rule is not a personal 
constitutional right. It is not calculated 
to redress the injury to the privacy of the 
victim of the search or seizure, for any 
M
 [reparation comes too late." Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
'the rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect...." 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). The Court went on in 
Powell to state: 
The standing requirement is premised on 
the view that the 'additional benefits of 
extending the . . . rule' to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are 
outweighed by the 'further encroachment upon 
the public interest in prosecuting those 
accused of crime and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth.' Alderman v. United 
States, supra, at 174-175 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 489-90. See also. United States v. Ceccolini# 435 U.S. 
268, 275-76. 
Nothing in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 
supra or in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) changes 
the initial burden which defendants must meet to establish a 
violation of their rights and their entitlement to suppression of 
allegedly illegally seized evidence. At no stage during this 
case, either at the trial level, before the Utah Court of 
Appeals, or before this Court, have defendants challenged or even 
identified any subpoena issued personally to them, nor 
established any standing to raise issues vicariously involving 
subpoenas issued to third parties. 
Under the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary 
rule, the good faith exception would apply to the facts of this 
case, in the event that petitioners had shown a violation of 
their Fourth Amendment rights justifying the initial application 
of the exclusionary rule. The "good faith" exception or 
"objectively reasonable" standard discussed by this Court in 
Mendoza, supra and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
does not apply, since the defendants have failed to show that any 
evidence was illegally taken. 
B. Self Incrimination! 
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution 
provides protection against self-incrimination. Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution protects a person from being 
compelled to give evidence against himself. 
The Fifth Amendment protection against self 
incrimination like the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that has 
not been permitted to be asserted on behalf of third parties. 
"It is important to reiterate that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal 
privilege: it adheres basically to the 
person, not to information that may 
incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put 
it: 'A party is privileged from producing 
the evidence but not from its production.' 
Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 
(1913). The Constitution explicitly 
prohibits compelling an accused to bear 
witness 'against himself; it necessarily 
does not proscribe incriminating statements 
elicited from another. 
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1972) 
(emphasis in original). 
Defendants seek to create a Fifth Amendment right, and 
a corresponding Utah right derived from Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution, against self incrimination when 
defendants' bankers, accountants, and business associates are 
subpoenaed to testify and produce documents as part of the 
special investigation. The broad protections outlined in In re 
Criminal Investigation, supra and cited in defendants' brief, 
(see Defendants' Brief pp. 11-12) are protections they attempt to 
assert for themselves as third parties for and in behalf of 
witnesses who in fact are not the defendants. 
The U.S. Supreme court has dealt with a case where 
records were subpoenaed from an accused's accountant in Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972). The Court held, 
In the case before us the ingredient 
of personal compulsion against an accused is 
lacking. The summons and the order of the 
District Court enforcing it are directed 
against the accountant. He, not the 
taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do 
anything. And the accountant makes no claim 
that he may tend to be incriminated by the 
production. Inquisitorial pressure or 
coercion against a potentially accused 
person, compelling her, against her will, to 
utter self-condemning words or produce 
incriminating documents is absent. In the 
present case, no 'shadow of testimonial 
compulsion upon or enforced communication by 
the accused' is involved. 
Id. at 329, (citations and footnote omitted). 
Defendants attempt to support their position citing the 
fact that Brent Fletcher was not informed of his target status 
when his deposition was taken (Defendants' Brief p.12). However, 
Mr. Fletcher's trial was severed from that of defendants, he is 
not an appellant in this case, and his deposition was suppressed 
and not used against him in his trial, nor obviously against the 
defendants. Defendants' reference to the Fletcher deposition is 
an example of their attempt to find some personal rights 
violation vicariously, and further demonstrates defendants' lack 
of any violation of their own right against self-incrimination. 
In fact, defendants were never subpoenaed to testify 
during the investigation. They have claimed that they were put 
into a position of having to incriminate themselves. Therefore, 
the defendants, at the time of the subpoena, and "at the time the 
records were admitted at trial, [were] not subjected to 'the 
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.'" 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976). The protections 
against self incrimination sought by defendants have not been 
recognized as part of Fifth Amendment protection nor of Article 
I, Section 12, Utah State Constitutional protection against self 
incrimination and should not now become one. To allow a 
defendant to claim the privilege against self incrimination when 
other witnesses are subpoenaed to testify or produce physical 
evidence about that defendant would unnecessarily muzzle law 
enforcement efforts at detecting, investigating, and prosecuting 
criminal conduct. 
C. Due Processt 
Defendants assert a Due Process violation in that, 
••Judge Bunnell terminated the investigation because of violations 
of constitutional rights of the subjects of this investigation." 
(Defendants' Brief p. 13). Defendants again fail to cite any 
facts as to what, where, when, or how their personal rights were 
violated. They point out the fact that Judge Bunnell could not 
rule on the admissibility of the evidence they seek to exclude. 
Obviously, Judge Bunnell could not rule on the admissibility of 
the evidence, inasmuch as trial was held in Salt Lake County 
before the Third District Court, but there is nothing about that 
fact that worked any prejudicial error against the defendants. 
Defendants seek to strengthen their claim of a Due 
Process violation by reasserting Fourth Amendment interests 
(Defendants' Brief p. 14) and by noting that this Court said the 
investigation was inadequately documented, thus forcing 
defendants "to argue [their] case before a judge who was 
unfamiliar with the details of the investigation • . . improperly 
saddle[ing defendants] with the burden of proving both a 
'substantial violation' of fundamental rights and 'lack of good 
faith' on the part of the investigating officer." (Defendants' 
Brief p. 14). Inasmuch as they were never subpoenaed, the 
defendants did not suffer the Due Process violation they allege; 
they were not improperly saddled with the burden of proving a 
lack of good faith or a substantial violation of fundamental 
rights. 
D. Equal Protectioni 
The defendants suggest (p. 17 of Defendant's Brief) 
that this Court ruled In The Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 
supra, that notice must be given to targets of the investigation. 
This generalization misstates the holding of that case. This 
Court required that notice be given to subpoenaed targets, but 
did not hold, indeed specifically reserved the question in 
footnote 23, of whether notice must be given to the target of an 
investigation if the target has not been subpoenaed. No equal 
protection, uniform operation of laws rights arise when a target 
is being investigated but not subpoenaed. 
Defendants assert that, "the manner in which the 
investigation was carried out in the instant case violated 
defendants' rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution." (Defendants' Brief p. 11). 
Such an assertion could have validity only if this 
Court finds that a criminal defendant convicted upon evidence 
gathered from third parties has the right to notice and the right 
to challenge subpoenas issued to third parties to investigate 
that defendant before the filing of an information. 
The defendants seek to extend the warning and notice 
requirements from subpoenaed parties to anyone who is a target of 
the investigation. As indicated, this Court did not hold that 
such notice was required in In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988). 
Defendants refer to the requirement of disclosure of 
the good cause affidavit. Defendants express concern that 
without access to the good cause affidavit, individuals receiving 
subpoenas would not be able to determine whether the information 
sought came within the scope of the Affidavit. (See Defendants' 
Brief p. 10). Defendants further assert that the secrecy 
provisions of the Act were applied to broadly. While these are 
legitimate concerns as they relate to subpoenaed persons, they 
raise no legitimate issue as to the rights of persons not 
subpoenaed. For the defendants to gain the position they seek, 
this Court would have to extent the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures under Art I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution to subpoenas issued to third parties so that the 
target of an investigation would have to be given full and 
adequate notice that the target's banker, accountant, business 
associates, friends, relatives, etc., etc., etc. have been 
subpoenaed. 
The issue of whether a defendant can assert a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment of State constitutional rights through 
the investigation of a third party, e.g., bankers and CPAs, was 
expressly reserved by this Court in In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, supra, at 654, fn 23 which states, 
" a broad subpoena issued to a third party 
may invoke a target's privacy interests. 
Although under federal law it has been held 
that a target cannot challenge the 
investigation of a third party, we have never 
addressed the question as a matter of state 
law." (citations omitted). 
Defendants seek to overturn their convictions by having 
this Court extend warning and notice requirements to anyone who 
is a target of the investigation whether or not they were 
subpoenaed. As noted above such a policy may frustrate the 
investigative process and would not serve any legitimate 
constitutional concern. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM BANK RECORDS WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendants have attempted in previous submissions to 
this Court to establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests in the subpoenas directed at third parties by 
citing, Burrows v. Superior Courtf 529 P.2d 590 (Calif. 1974). 
In Burrows, bank records were suppressed because they 
were obtained without a warrant, subpoena, or any court process 
whatsoever. It is this unique fact which the California court 
focuses on in holding that the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his bank records. The court 
acknowledges that federal cases hold that bank depositors have 
neither proprietary interests in bank records, nor standing under 
the Fourth Amendment to resist court process directed at the bank 
records, and points out the factual distinction which they feel 
merits their finding a violated privacy interest under the state 
constitution in Burrows: 
[I]t is worthy of note that the 
foregoing and other federal cases involved 
more than an informal request for 
information: the material was furnished in 
response to a summons or subpoena issued 
either by an administrative body in 
connection with an investigation, which 
• • • 
process is enforced by judicial order 
or by a court in the context of a criminal 
proceeding. 
Burrows, 529 P.2d 590, 594 (1974). 
The majority opinion in Schultz contains 
a statement to the effect that a summons 
directed to a third-party bank is not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of 
either the bank or the person under 
investigation by the authorities. (416 U.S. 
at p. 53, 94 S.Ct. 1494.) Of course here we 
have no summons or other court process. 
Burrowsy 529 P.2d 590, 595 (1974), n. 3. 
The Burrows court claims consistency with United States 
v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974). In Miller, the Fifth 
Circuit accepted a bank customer's claim to have a privacy 
interest in microfilmed bank records, which were obtained by 
government agents through allegedly defective subpoenas duces 
tecum. In reversing that portion of the Miller decision, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of 
the depositor are implicated here, this case 
is governed by the general rule that the 
issuance of a subpoena to a third party to 
obtain the records of that party does not 
violate the rights of a defendant. . . . 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
In Miller, the Supreme Court effectively limits Burrows 
to its facts: 
This case differs from Burrows v. 
Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 238, 118 Cal. Rptr. 
166, 529 P.2d 590 (1974), relied on by Mr. 
Justice Brennan in dissent, in that the bank 
records of respondent's accounts were 
furnished in response to "compulsion by legal 
process" in the form of subpoena duces tecum. 
The court in Burrows found it "significant . 
• . that the bank [in that case] provided the 
statements to the police in response to an 
informal oral request for information. • . •H 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435f 445 (1976), fn 7. 
While this Court has the power to exceed the protection 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by interpreting Article I Section 14, the parallel 
provision in the Utah Constitution, differently it should not 
adopt the Burrows construction of a privacy interest in bank 
records held by bank customers. Burrows has been rejected in 
Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572, 577 (Wyo. 1979) and its 
reasoning was not adopted in Peters v. Sjoholm, 604 P.2d 527 
(Wash. App. 1979). The United States Supreme Court's resolution 
of Miller represents the position taken in most cases. See State 
v. Melvin, 357 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1987); State v. Fredette, 
411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979) United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733 
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reddick, 519 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 
1975); and United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979). 
In the present case, evidence was obtained through 
valid legal process. In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 
754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), this Court in that case did not hold 
that any subpoena issued or evidence introduced against the 
defendants was done so in violation of their constitutional 
rights. In State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268 (N.H. 1983), Burrows was 
adopted because it harmonized with a New Hampshire statute, and 
in People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85 (111. App. 1983), Burrows was 
adopted because it harmonized with a privacy provision separate 
from the search and seizure provision in the state constitution. 
In Jackson, after recognizing the Burrows quasi-
privilege/ the court noted that the gathering of evidence through 
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subpoena duces tecum is a constructive search, presenting no 
actual search and seizure questions. The Jackson court evaluated 
the constructive search in that case, found that it was 
reasonable, and did not suppress the evidence which consisted of 
bank records. 
Most of the state court decisions expanding the 
protection of state search and seizure provisions beyond the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment occur in cases where there is an 
immediate and intimate violation of a privacy interest. See 
Lafave; Search and Seizure, section 1.3 p. 44. In this case, the 
asserted violation of privacy came through subpoenas duces tecum 
as to which defendants had no standing to object. Thus, 
defendants cannot claim immediacy of the violation, nor can they 
effectively assert that the violation was intimate: the 
subpoenas were not directed to them. 
Defendants have presented no compelling argument for 
this Court's recognition of the Burrows quasi-privilege under the 
Utah Constitution. Even if there were such a compelling argument 
and recognition, it would have no bearing on this case. 
Defendants here are challenging subpoenas, "legal process," 
issued under the authority of Judge Boyd Bunnell in Emery County, 
which render Burrows inapposite. 
In United States v. Miller, 425. U.S. 435 (1976), the 
Supreme Court examined the issues of a depositor's Fourth 
Amendment interests in bank records. Respondent was charged with 
various federal offenses and sought to suppress bank records. He 
contended that the subpoena duces tecum pursuant to which the 
material had been produced by the banks were defective and 
therefore the records were illegally seized in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment Rights. The Court noted that checks are 
"negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions/' 
not -confidential communications." IcL at 442. The Court 
further noted that all the documents that had been obtained from 
the bank, including financial statements and deposit slips, 
"contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." 
Id. at 442. The Court held, 
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here 
are not respondent's "private papers." 
Unlike the Claimant in Boyd, respondent can 
assert neither ownership nor possession. 
Instead, these are the business records of 
the banks. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1975). The Court 
went on to hold, 
[s]ince no Fourth Amendment interests of the 
depositor are implicated here, this case is 
governed by the general rule that the 
issuance of a subpoena to a third party to 
obtain the records of that party does not 
violate the rights of a defendant, even if 
criminal prosecution is contemplated at the 
time the subpoena is issued. 
United State v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (quoting 
California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53. The 
foundation for the Court's holding was based on the principle 
that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when information 
revealed to third parties is thereafter conveyed by the third 
party to the government. 
It is established that, when a person 
communicates information to a third party 
even on the understanding that the 
communication is confidential, he cannot 
object if the third party conveys that 
information or records thereof to law 
enforcement authorities (citations omitted). 
Relying on that principle, the Court has held 
that a customer of a bank cannot challenge on 
Fourth Amendment grounds the admission into 
evidence in a criminal prosecution of 
financial records obtained by the Government 
from his bank pursuant to allegedly defective 
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given 
no notice of the subpoenas. 
SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In State v. Melvin, 357 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1987) 
defendant (appellant) attempted to assert a Fourth Amendment 
interest in bank records of third persons for whom he acted as an 
estate administrator, and in bank records in his own personal 
rental accounts. The North Carolina Court of Appeals following 
United States v. Miller, supra, and State v. Overton, 60 N.C. 
App. 1, 298 S.E.2d 695, disc, rev, denied and appeal dism'd, 307 
N.C. 580, 299 S.E.2d 652 (1983) held that defendant has no Fourth 
Amendment interest in bank records his own or those of others 
regardless of the manner in which they are obtained. The Court 
stated: 
Defendant's contentions that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated when the state 
obtained an Application for Examination of 
Records instead of a subpoena duces tecum and 
when it received some records without even 
this document are meritless. He had no 
standing to contest the disclosure of the 
information, and his motion to suppress was, 
therefore, properly denied. 
State v. Overton, 60 N.C* App. at 31, 298 S.E.2d 713, 
Further, the Utah Legislature has specifically declared 
that privacy interests of the depositor in bank records becomes 
secondary, when those records are sought as part of an official 
investigation. The Legislature in defining the scope of privacy 
in financial records adopted a specific exception for official 
investigations conducted by the Attorney General. Specifically 
the statute states; 
Nothing in this act shall apply where an 
examination of said records is a part of an 
official investigation by any local police, 
sheriff, city attorney, county attorney, the 
attorney general, or the State Department of 
Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery 
Services, Department of Social Services. 
Utah Code Annotated, S 78-27-50 (1987). 
The records, appellants seek to exclude from evidence, 
fall directly within the parameters and scope of section 78-27-
50. The legislature has determined that any privacy interest in 
financial records is subsumed by the importance of an official 
investigation. In In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 
738 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1987)3 , this Court in ruling on whether § 
78-27-50 exempts the Attorney General from reimbursing the bank 
for the costs of producing records pursuant to its subpoena in an 
official investigation, this Court after quoting the Section, 
cited above, held 
Not to be confused with the In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), cited earlier. 
-That section clearly exempts law 
enforcement agencies, including the attorney 
general, from all provisions of the Act, not 
just the requirement of paying costs. 
Nothing in the Act applies to an 
investigation by the attorney general; 
therefore, the Act has no bearing on the 
question before us." Ici. at 1029. 
While it is true that only the question of payment of 
fees for the reproduction of bank records was addressed in that 
matter, this Court's holding is applicable to the question of 
whether or not depositors in financial institutions have the 
right, under provisions of the Judicial Code specifically § 78-
27-45 through 50, (see Addendum D) to the protections of those 
sections regarding notification, right to intervene, and 
restrictions on admissibility of evidence. Section 78-27-50 
answers that question decisively by providing that those 
protections of the Code do not apply in official investigations 
conducted by the Attorney General. This Court's holding cited 
above leaves no doubt that "nothing in the act applies to an 
investigation by the Attorney General." While § 78-27-45 et.seq. 
and this Courts ruling in In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, 738 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1987) may not be entirely 
dispositive of the issue presented in this case, those provisions 
do show a legislative intent to exempt the Attorney General among 
other agencies from the notice requirements argued for by the 
defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants have no standing to challenge the 
admission of evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers 
Act. No constitutional right, state or federal, personal to the 
defendants, has been shown to have been violated. The State of 
Utah respectfully urges the Court to affirm the convictions of 
the defendants. 
DATED this day of vie- t 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
STANLEY 
Assistc 
OLSEN 
Attorney General 
-28-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH to the following this 
day of O^K£, , 1989: 
JOHN F. CLARK 
CLARK L. SNELSON 
SESSIONS AND MOORE 
505 East 200 South 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
V. L L ^ — 
29-
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
SUBPOENA POWERS 77-22-2 
attend and testify in this state he shall not, while in this state pursuant 
to such summons, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or 
criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into 
this state under the summons. 
If a person passes through this state while going to another state in obe-
dience to a summons to attend and testify in that state or while returning 
therefrom he shall not, while so passing through this state, be subject to 
arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with mat-
ters which arose before his entrance into this state under the summons. 
History: C 2*53. 77-2]-5. enacted by L Collateral Bsferaacae. 
1980, ch 15, f Z Arreit C=> ft Process ** 120 
p,Mi-tifiiitiiL 6 A aS A r m l » W. 72 CJS Process | SO 
Crass-Karereecas. S AmJur tt 78S, ArTaat 1108 
Similar provision for witnesses la civil 
suits, 7S-24-12. 
CHAPTER 22 
SUBPOENA POWERS FOR AID OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION AND GRANTS OF IMMUNITY 
Section 
77-22-1 Declaration of necessity 
77*22-2 Right to subpoens sritnesses and require production of evidence — Contents of sub-
poens — Interrogation before closed court. 
77-224 Immunit) granted to witness — Refusal of witness to testify or produce evidence 
— Powers granted prosecuting tttorneys in addition to other powers. 
77-22-1. Declaration of ueceeaity. It ia declared, as a matter of legis-
lative determination, that it ia necessary to grant aubpoena powers in aid 
of criminal investigations and to provide a method of keeping information 
gained from investigations aecret both to protect the innocent and to pre-
vent criminal suspects from having access to information prior to prosecu-
tion and to clarify the power of the attorney general and county attorneys 
to grant immunity from proaecution to witnesses whoae testimony ia esaen-
tia) to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or proaecution. 
History: C 1*53, 77-22-1, aaactad by L promt EUTV, lac v. Coadtr (1961) 635 F 2d 
ItSO.elLlMt 412. 
Praascetor's paMie statosaeuta. Farpseas af Act. 
Tail Act has codified the elementary prin- The purposes of the secrecy provisions af 
dpic af criminal justice that prosecutors are this Act art to protect the innocent and also 
required to try their cases ia the courtroom to prevent criminal suspects from having 
aad that it is wholly inappropriate far them access to investigative information prior to 
to make public damaging aUegstions against prosecution KUTV, lac. v. Coader (1981) (35 
a putative defendant during the discovery r 2d 411 
77-22-2, Right to aubpoena witneaaea and require production of evi-
dence — Contenta of aubpoena — Interrogation before cloeed court. 
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the existence of 
a crime or malfeasance in office or any criminal conspiracy or activity, the 
127 
77-22-3 UTAH OODK Of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
attorney general or any county attorney shall have the right, upon applica-
tion and approval of the district court, for good cause shown, to conduct 
an investigation in which the prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel 
their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court 
reporter, and require the production of books, papera, documents, record-
ings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to 
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attor-
ney. 
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants 
and need only contain notification that the testimony of the witness is 
sought in aid of criminal investigation and state the time and place of the 
examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdication 
of the prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform the party served that 
he is entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall 
be paid as in a civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney may make written 
application to any district court and the court may order that interrogation 
of any witness shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be secret; and 
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for 
good cause otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from any inves-
tigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the attorneys represent-
ing the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter and the 
attorney for the witness. 
History: C 1953, T7-22-2* enacted by L refusal to product noncorporate document* 
1980, eh IS, 12. in possession of person asserting privilege 
Collator*! sUfsrsaca*. b u t 0W1,ad b y *n o t h t r - ** A L R M 1373* 
Corporste book, and rsconU. custody or Self-incriminstion, right of member, om-
possession who has possession, custody, or •*• *»Mt» * * » • * " <* P n v * * corporaUon 
control of corporate books or records for pur- •* aaincorporatad association to assert per-
poses of order to produce, 47 ALR 3d 676. sonal privilege against self-incrimination 
Self-incrimination, possession: privilege with respect to production of corporste books 
against self-incrimination as ground for or racords, 52 ALR 3d 636. 
77-22-3, Immunity granted to witness — Refusal of witness to tes-
tify or produce evidence — Powers granted prosecuting attorneys in 
addition to other powers. In any investigation or prosecution of a crimi-
nal case, the attorney general and any county attorney shall have the 
power to grant transactional immunity from prosecution to any person 
who is called or who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf of the 
state whenever the attorney general or county attorney deems that the tes-
timony of cuch person is necessary to the investigation or prosecution of 
such a case. No prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any 
crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under this action, pro-
vided that should the person testify falsely, nothing herein contained shall 
be construed to prevent prosecution for perjury. 
If during the investigation or prosecution a person refuses to answer a 
question or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be 
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the subpoena may file a request 
ItB 
SEARCH AND ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS 77*22-3 
in writing with the district court in which the examination is being con-
ducted for an order requiring that person to answer the question or 
produce the evidence requested. The court shall set a time for hearing and 
order the person to appear before the court to show cause, if any he has, 
why the question should not be answered or the evidence produced, and 
the court ahall order the question answered or the evidence produced 
unless it finds thai to do so would be clearly contrary to the public interest, 
or could subject the witness to a criminal prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion. If the witness still refuses to answer or produce the evidence, he shall 
be guilty of contempt of court and punished accordingly. If the witness 
complies with the order and he would have been privileged to withhold the 
answer given or the evidence produced by him except for this section, that 
person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on 
account of any fact or act conerning which, he was ordered to answer or 
produce evidence except he may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected 
to penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in 
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or failing to produce any 
evidence in accordance with the order. 
The powers specified in this chapter are in addition to any other powers 
granted to the attorney general or county attorneys. 
* History: C 1953, 77-22-3, enacted by I* Public officer constitutional privilege as 
1980, eh 15,12. violated by removal or discharge of public 
_ „ . « * officer or employee because of assertion of 
Collateral Rtferofteoa. immunity, 44 ALR 2d 790 
Witnesses $ » 304 Right of defendant in criminal proceeding 
96 CJS Witnesses 1439 ^
 n a v e jmmunit) from prosecution granted 
SI AmJur 2d 87-98. Witnesses | | S4-€l to defense witness, 4 ALR tih 617 
Adequacy of immunity offered as condition Waiver of privilege, in exchange for immu-
of denial of privilege against aelf-incrimina- nity from prosecution, as barring reaasertion 
tion, S3 ALR 2d 1030 of privilege or account of prosecution in 
Attorneys use in disbarment proceeding of another jurisdiction, 2 ALR 2d 631 
testimon> given by attorney in criminal pro-
eeeding under grant of immunity, €2 ALR 3d U w «wwa. 
1145 Utah Supreme Court Survey - 1977, 1978 
Prosecutor's power to grant prosecution Utah L Rev. 389,411. 
witness immunity from prosecution, 4 ALR 
4th 1221. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
AjsbigvJty as U scope of iamammlty. Aothority to grant iamsasualty. 
The state may not claim any benefit from Deputy county attorney did not have 
the ambiguous aature of the prosecuting authority to grant immunity from prosecu-
attorney's grant of immunity, and any ques- tion aa such a grant must have been made b> 
tions of interpretation must be resolved in the attorney general or count) attorney 
l a w of the defendant State •. Ward (1977) State v. Ward (1977) 571 F Id 1343 
171 F 2d 1343, Stats ?. Anderson (1980) €12 F 
urn 
CHAPTER 23 
SEARCH AND ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS 
Section 
77-23-1. "Starch warrant" deAood 
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SUBPOENA POWERS 
1989 
CENERAL SESSION 
rolled Copy 
B. Ilo. 117 By Lyle W. Uillyard 
ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVIDING REVISIONS TO THE 
SUBPOENA POWERS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. 
IS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
[ENDS: 
77-22-2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 19B8 
77-22-3, AS EXACTED BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1980 
KACTSi 
77-22-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
77-22-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
e it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 77-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
unended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1988, is amended to read: 
77-22-2. (1) (a) In any Batter involving the investigation of a 
:rime or malfeasance in office, or any criminal conspiracy or activity, 
the attorney general or any county attorney may, upon application and 
approval of the district courtC?] and for good cause shown, conduct [an] 
a criminal investigation. [For-the-investigationy-the-preseeutor] 
(b) The application and statement of good cause shall state vhc-her 
any other investigative order related to the investigation at issue has 
been filed in another court. 
S. B. No. 117 
(2) (a) The attorney general or county attorney may subpoena 
witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under oath to be 
recorded by a suitable electronic recording device or to be given before 
any certified court reporter, and require the production of books, 
papers, documents9 recordings and any other items [which] that constitute 
evidence or may be relevant to the investigation [rn-the-judgment-of—the 
attorney-generat-or-coonty-attorney]. 
(b) The attorney general or county attorney shall first apply to the 
district court for each subpoena, showing that the requested information 
is reasonably related to the criminal investigation authorised by the 
court* 
(3) The prosecutor shall state in each subpoena: 
(a) the time and place of the interrogation; 
(b) that the subpoena is issued in aid of a criminal investigation; 
and 
(c) the right to have counsel present. 
(4) The prosecutor shall also personally inform each witness at the 
beginning of each compelled interrogation: 
(a) of the general subject matter of the investigation; 
(b) of the privilege at any time during the proceeding to refuse to 
answer any question or produce any evidence of a communicative nature 
that may result in self-incrimination; 
(c) that any information provided may be used against the witness in 
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a subsequent criminal proceeding; and 
(d) of the right to have counsel present• 
(5) If the attorney general or county attorney has substantial 
evidence that the subpoenaed witness has committed a crime that is under 
investigation he shall inform that witness, in person prior to 
interrogation, of that witness's target status and of the nature of the 
charges under consideration against him. 
[{2}] (6) (a) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible 
defendants [and-need-onfcyt-eontain^otification-that-the-testimony-of-the 
witnessHrs-sooght-xn-aid-of-eriminal-investrgationt] but shall state the 
time and place of the examination, which may be conducted anywhere within 
the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing the subpoenalfand-inform-the 
party-served-that-he-is-entitied-to-be-represented-by-cotxnsei]. 
(b) Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
Cf3$] (7) (a) The attorney general or any county attorney may make 
written application to any district court [and] showing a reasonable 
likelihood that publicly releasing information about the identity of a 
witness or the substance of the evidence resulting from a subpoena or 
interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede 
the investigation. Upon a finding of reasonable likelihood, the court 
may order that£ 
Ci) interrogation of [any] m witness be held in secret; [that-the 
proceeding] 
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(ii) the occurrence of the interrogation and other subpoenaing of 
Evidence, the identity of the person subpoenaedf and the substance of the 
evidence obtained be kept secret; and [that] 
(iii) the record of testimony and other subpoenaed evidence be kept 
secret unless [and-tintit] the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
[The] 
(b) After application, the court auty bjr order (excluded] exclude 
from any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the 
attorneys representing the state [and]x ©embers of their staffs, persons 
who in the judgment of the attorneys representing the state are 
reasonably necessary to assist in the investigative process, the court 
reporter or operator of the electronic recording device, and the attorney 
for the witness. 
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent attorneys representing the 
state or members of their staff from disclosing information obtained 
pursuant to this chapter for the purpose of furthering any official 
governmental investigation. 
(8) If the state's application and good cause showing for the order 
authorizing the investigation and the order itself contain the identities 
of witnesses and targets of the investigation, the attorney general or 
county attorney may submit an application to any district court showing a 
reasonable likelihood that publicly releasing information about those 
identities would pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede 
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the investigation. The court may order that the application, good cause 
shoving, and order for the entire investigation be kept secret unless the 
court for good cause otherwise orders. 
Section 2. Section 77-22-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter IS, Lavs of Utah 1980, is amended to read: 
77-22-3. (1) In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
case, the attorney general and any county attorney [shall-have-the—power 
to] may grant transactional immunity from prosecution to any person who 
is called or vho is intended to be called as a witness [in] on behalf of 
the state [whenever] when the attorney general or county attorney [deems] 
finds that the testimony of [such] the person is necessary to the 
investigation or prosecution of [such-a] the case* [Ho] 
(2) (a) A prosecution [shaii] may not be instituted against the 
person for any crime disclosed by his testimony [which-is-priviieged 
ander-this-action—provided-that-shooid] pursuant to this chapter, unless 
the evidence is volunteered by such person or is not responsive to a 
question. 
(b) However, if the person [testify] testifies falsely, [nothing 
herein-contarned-shaH-be—construed—to] immunity granted under this 
section does not prevent prosecution for perjury* 
13) (a) If during the investigation or prosecution [a] any person 
refuses to answer a question or produce evidence of any kind on the 
ground that he may be incriminated [thereby], the attorney issuing the 
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subpoena nay file [a-reqoest] an application in writing with the district 
court in which the examination is being conducted for an order requiring 
that person to answer the question or produce the evidence requested. 
(b) The court shall set a time for hearing and order the person to 
appear [before-the-court] to show cause!7—if—any—he—hasj] why the 
question should not be answered or the evidence producedtj-and-the]^ 
(c) The court shall order the question answered or the evidence 
produced unless it finds that [to-do-so] ijt would be clearly contrary to 
the public interest!?] or could subject the witness to a criminal 
prosecution in another jurisdiction. 
(d) If the witness still refuses to answer or produce the evidence, 
he [shall—be] j_i guilty of contempt of court and shall be punished 
accordingly* 
(e) If the witness complies with the order and he would have been 
privileged to withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by him 
except for this section, [that-pereon-shaii] he may not be prosecuted or 
subjected to penalty or forfeiture on account of any fact or act 
concerning which!?] he was ordered to answer or produce evidence 
[except]. However, he may [nevertheless] be prosecuted or subjected to 
penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in 
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or failing to produce any 
evidence in accordance with the order. 
(fhe-powers-specified-in-this-chapter-are-in-addrtion—to—any—other 
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powers-granted-to-the-attorney-generai-or-cottnty-attorneytT] 
Section 3. Section 77-22-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to 
read: 
77-22-4. In all investigations under Section 77-22-2f the attorney 
general or county attorney shall maintain and file with the district 
court the following records of the criminal investigation, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court: 
(1) a copy of the good cause statement and application for the 
authorisation of the criminal investigation; 
(2) a copy of all motions made to the court by the attorney general 
or the county attorney; 
(3) a copy of all court orders; 
(A) a copy of all subpoenas issued; 
(5) detailed descriptions of all documents and other evidence 
produced in response to subpoenas; 
(6) a copy of all transcripts of testimony taken pursuant to the 
subpoena; and 
(7) a copy of all written communications between the court and the 
attorney general or county attorney and staff* 
Section *• Section 77-22-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to 
read: 
77-22-5. The powers of this chapter are in addition to any other 
powers granted to the attorney general or county attorneys. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) RELATIVE TO 
A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION j CONSTITUTIONALITY 
i CS NO. 1 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held In this 
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties 
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investiga-
tion proceeding. The Court ruled from the bench on most 
Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et seq.), authorizing 
the Investigative procedure being used as raised by several 
of the parties for the first time 1n their own behalf and by 
ether parties en a Motion to reconsider. 
The Court previously considered the constitutional 
challenge to the Act at a hearing held en May 30, 1984, and 
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the 
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that 1n 
Its application the Statt Prosecutors comply with tht follow-
ing requirements: 
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to tht 
Act aust be Informed whether or not thty Art 
targets of the Investigation; 
Recorded in Judzment feci 
2. Such witnesses Bust be informed of 
the nature of the natter under Investigation 
and the scope of the Investigation; 
3. Investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to 
criminal Investigations within the parameters 
of the Initial good cause affidavit. 
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity 
to see the manner In which the Act has been applied and 1s 
being applied and the way 1t can be used to violate the 
personal rights of the citizens of this state. 
For Instance* the subpoena duces tecum served upon 
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce: 
•records which Identify all officers, 
directors, consultants and employees 
(both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 
1979 to the present. Such shall Include, 
but not be limited to, names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of employment* 
and emp1o>ee numbers. If known." 
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general 
subpoena suppressed as being too broad In any Investigation 
of any criminal activity. 
A previous subpoena Issued by the Attorney General's 
Office attempted to get Into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings In uranium mining, when 1n fact the original Good 
Cause Affidavit mentioned no Indication of any criminal deal-
ings In this area. The Statt withdrew this subpoena when 
challenged In this court. 
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Another subpoena Issued out of this proceeding 
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of 
the following: 
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, papers of any kind relating to 
Hike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex, 
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, Individually; M1ke Hemskl, 
Individually; Bruce Conklln, Individually; Patsy 
Bowman, Individually; and all other Individuals 
and/or entitles associated therewith." 
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge 1n 
this Court. 
The deposition of I. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant 
to subpoena Issued under this Investigative proceeding, did 
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be 
imposed to make the Act constltulonal in its application 1n 
that the witness never was Informed that he was a target, 
nor as to the nature of the Investigation and, because of 
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the natter 
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause 
showing. He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present 
with him during these proceedings. 
Some criminal charges have already been filed 1n Salt 
Lake County based upon Information obtained through this proceed 
1ng, and a civil antitrust case has been filed In Salt Lake 
County, also as a result of tome of the Information derived fro» 
this investigative proceeding. This investigative proceeding 1* 
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still open and being used for whatever purposes the State 
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act, 
without limitation as to when • criminal Investigation 
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
The Act has been abused and 1s subject to continued 
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limit-
atlons upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena power. The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme 
Court 1n its statement given 1n the case of In Re The Matter of 
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows: 
"When State action Impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permlssable conduct so as 
to avoid unwarranted Intrusion on those rights." 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act 
1s too vague and does not give proper protection to individual 
citizens against violation of their constltulonal right of 
due process and protection against self-incrimination and 
allows for an absolute abuse of. power without the benefit of 
Judicial review or control once the general subpoena power 
1s granted tnd finds the Act Is unconstitutional. 
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this 
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court. 
DATED this <^/^day .. September, 1984. 
/" ~BOYD «NNFLLf-"DjSTBirf COURT,' 
•I-
ADDENDUM D 
Financial information privacy — W ritten con-
sent or court order for disclosure by financial 
institution — Exception — "Person" defined. 
No person acting in behalf of the state, or any agency, office, department, 
bureau or political subdivision thereof, shall request or obtain, by subpoena or 
otherwise, information from a state or federally chartered financial institu-
tion regarding the financial transactions or other records reflecting the finan-
cial condition of any person without first obtaining written permission from 
the person whose financial transactions or other records of financial condition 
are to be examined, or obtaining an order from a court of competent jurisdic-
tion permitting access to the information. This section does not apply to re-
views made by the commissioner of financial institutions to determine 
whether or not a financial institution is operating in accordance with law. As 
used in this act "person" shall include an individual, corporation, partnership 
or association 
K t im7 C|L 143 | L Uw§ 1977, Chapter 143, which appea n§ an 
of "this act". - The Urm "this *S 78-27-45 to 78-27-50 
= * in the laat atntenct. M i n i Croaa-Referencca. - Credit information 
•ichange, I 7-14-1 at aaq. 
78-27-46. Financial information privacy — Notice to pei-
•on about whom information sought 
(1) In the event a court order is obtained pursuant to § 78 27-45, notice 
thereof shall be given to the person about whom information is sought within 
three days of the day on which service of the order is made upon the financial 
institution, but no later than seven days before the day fixed in the order as 
the day upon which the records are to be produced or examined. The notice 
shall be accompanied by a copy of the order which has been served upon the 
financial institution and the motion or application upon which it is based and 
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the rights of the person 
under § 78-27-47 
(2) The notice shall be sufficient if, on or before the third day after issuance 
of the order, notice is served in the manner provided in Rule 4(e), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, upon the person entitled to notice, or is mailed by certified 
or registered mail to the last known address of the person. In the event the 
person entitled to notice is deceased or under legal disability, notice shall be 
served upon or mailed to the last known address of such person's executor 
adminfstrator, guardian or other fiduciary. 
Mint! " i ' 11 Ill Ill Il 1 11 Ilia , (1 2 
78-27-4* financial informatkm privacy — Intervention to 
challenge or stay order — Burden on governmen-
tal entity. 
!" h (.withstanding any other law or rule of law, any 'person w Ui . .: 
notice of a court order under § 78-27-46 shall have the right u r 
any proceeding with respect to enforcement of the order to challenge the 
iasuance of the order or to stay compliance therewith. Upon intervention, the 
burden shall be upon the state, agency, officer, department, bureau or politi-
cal subdivision obtaining the order to show that there is reasonable cause for 
the issuance of the order and that the information sought may further the 
investigation. 
78-27-48. Financial information privacj Reimburse-
ment of financial institution for costs of obtain-
ing information. 
Any financial institution which produced records pursuant to permission or 
in compliance with an order obtained under this act shall be entitled to reim-
bursement by the party or parties seeking the information, for costs reason-
ably and directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or transporting 
books, papers, records, or other data required to be produced. The commis-
78-27-49 JUDICIAL CODE 
sionei of financial institutions shall by regulation estau - i 
conditions under which reimbursement shall be made. 
Hiitory: L 1*77, ck 143, I 4. 
Meaning of "this act". — Ste note follow-
ing same catchline in note* to I 7S-27-45. 
'. . Financial information privacy Admissibility 
of information restricted. 
No information obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution 
in violation of the provisions of this act shall be admissible in any court of this 
state against the person entitled to notice. This section does not apply in any 
action between the financial institution and the person otherwise entitled to 
notice or in any action in which it is claimed that the financial institution has 
been the victim of fraud, embezzlement or any other criminal art committed 
by the person otherwise entitled to notice. 
History: L. 1977, ck. 143, I & 
Meaning of "this act". — Stt note follow-
ing same eatchhne in notes to I 78-27-45. 
7g.27.50. Financial information privacy — Act inapplica-
ble to certain official investigations. 
Nothing in this act shall apply where an examination of said records is a 
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney, 
county attorney, the attorney general, or the State Department of Public 
Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Services, Department of Social Services 
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ADDENDUM E 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITT TTTOKf OF THF JTNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMEN DMENT XX 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT IH 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but In, a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual aervice in time of War or public danger; nor ahall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness againat 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due proeeaa 
of law; nor shall private property be Uken for public use, without jnit 
compensation 
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ADDENDUM F 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in bis own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance ahall any accused person. 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or feet to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused ahall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife ahall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband sgainst bis wife, nor ahall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the aame offense. 
ADDENDUM 6 
CONSTITUTION OP UTAH A IT. I, { 14 
fee 14. [Unraasonable starches forbidden—Isiuanoa of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be aceure in their persona, boutea, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and aeizurea ahall not be vio-
lated, and no warrant ahull issue but upon probable eauae aupported by 
oath or aflBrmation, particularly describing the place to be aearched, and 
the person or thing to be srized. 
Oasptrsfela PttrUiaiL 
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